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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PETER G. CONDAS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SUGARHOUSE MERCAN-
TILE COMPANY, a Utah corp., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
9657 
DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT SUGARHOUSE 
MERCANTILE COMPANY'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is Plaintiff's action to quiet title. Defendants' 
defense is that there was a prior action between the same 
partries, involving the same property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Motion for Summary Judgment was made by the 
Defendant, and the Court granted it dismissing the 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant asked that the judgment of the lower 
court be sustained. 
STAT'EJ\fENT OF ]-,ACTS 
Plaintiff's Con1plaint alleges he is the owner of one-
half interest in certain real property. Defendant, Sugar-
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house Mercantile Co., denies that Plaint1iff has any inter-
est in the property and alleges a prior suit between the 
same parties involving the same property in which it 
was adjudged that Plaintiff, Mr. Condas, had no interest 
in the property. 
There can be no dispute about the facts in this case 
because it is all documentary consisting of pleadings 
and answers to Interrogatories. 
Sugarhouse Mercantile Co. sued Salt Lake County, 
R. J. Fry, Incorporated, Peter G. Condas and 1r!rs. Peter 
G. Condas, his wife, in a prior case which will herein-
after be referred to as the 1st case. R. J. Fry, Inc. was 
not served with Summons and did not enter its appear-
ance. Salt Lake County was served with Summons, but 
its default was ~ntered. Mr. and Mrs. Peter G. Condas 
entered their appearance and the case proceeded from 
thereon as a case between Sugarhouse Mercantile Co. 
and Mr. and Mrs. Peter G. Condas. Defendant, :Mr. 
Condas, claimed title through a tax deed frmn Salt Lake 
County, Mr. Gondas obtained judgment quieting title in 
his favor and against Sugarhouse Mercantile Co. Sugar-
house Mercantile Co. appealed the 1st case to the Su-
preme Court and while the case was pending on appeal 
Mr. Condas, on October 20, 1950 acquired a deed from 
R·. J. Fry, Inc. (R 37). There is nothing in the record to 
show what title, if any, R. J. Fr~~, Inc. had in the prop-
erty. 
The Suprmne Court reversed the lower court's deci-
sion because it was controlled by the case of Toronto vs. 
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Sheffield, 118 U. 460 2:22 P.2d 594, in which case this 
Court held Sec. 104-2-5. 10 Laws of Utah 1943 old statute 
on Limitations on Tax Titles was held to be unconstitu-
tional. Judgment was reversed and the cause remanded 
with instructions to grant a new trial unconditionally. 
The Supreme Court did not quiet title in the Sugarhouse 
Mercantile Co., but the judgment was reversed with in-
structions to grant a new trial, and said the defendant 
may present their claims for the amount they have paid 
to the county for the property as a condition of quieting 
appellant's title thereto .. 
\Ve quote the Utah Supreme Court's entire decision 
in the 1st case : 
IN T'HE SUPR.EME COURT OF THE STAT'E 
OFU·TAH 
Sugarhouse Mercantile Company, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 7487 
Salt Lake County, and R. J. Fry, Incorporated, 
Peter G. Condas, and 1frs. Peter G. Condas, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
PER CURIAM: 
Tills case is controlled by our decision in the 
case of Toronto vs. Sheffield, ________ Utah ________ , 2.22 
P.2d 594, in which Section 104-2-5.10, Laws of 
Utah, 1943, was held to be unconstitutional. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause re-
manded with instructions to grant a new trial 
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wherein defendants may present their claims for 
the amounts they have paid to the county for this 
property as a condition of quieting appellant's 
title thereto. Appellant shall recover its costs 
on appeal. 
Found at 225 P.2d 1050, 119 Utah 234. 
The case was remanded to the District Court for a 
new trial and a Demand for T·rial was made in accordance 
with the mandate and a new trial had. The Findings of 
Fact made at the trial (R 24) states: 
"The above entitled case was tried in the 
above court and that an appeal was taken to the 
Supreme Court and that a remittiture has been 
filed in the above entitled case and that said case 
was again set for trial and that said case came on 
for hearing before the Honorable Judge, Joseph 
G. Jeppson on the 3rd day of June, 1953 for a pre-
trial. Golden W. Robbins appearing as the attor-
ney for the plaintiff and :Mary J. Condas appear-
ing as attorney for the defendant, Peter G. Con-
das and Mrs. Peter G. Condas, his wife. That 
Salt Lake County default having been regularly 
entered, it was stipulated that the pre-trial should 
be the trial of the said case. Evidence was intro-
duced including the evidence introduced at the 
previous trial." 
The Court decreed in the new trial that the defen-
dants, Salt Lruke County, Peter G. Condas, and 1\Irs. 
Peter G. Condas, his wife, and each of the1n has no right, 
title interest or estate therein. (R 23). 
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At the time of the new trial on June 3, 1953, Mr. 
Conda.s had a deed from R. J. Fry, Inc. see Interroga-
torie·s (R 37). 
''Q. Did the plaintiff have a deed from R. 
J. Fry, Incorporated on the 31st day of January, 
1952~ 
"A. Yes, plaintiff obtained a deed from R. 
J. Fry, Inc. dated October 20, 1950; plaintiff 
thought this deed was lost and therefore obtained 
a second deed at a later date; plaintiff later dis-
covered, however, that the first deed had been 
recorded by his attorney, M:ary Condas. The deed 
was recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office in Book 809, P.age 413. 
Defendant asked Interrogatories, (R 13) which were 
not answered by Mr. Condas, but by his then attorney, 
who was F. Burton Howard, who set up a deed dated 
January 12, 1956, and the tax deed which was adjudicated 
in the first case (R15, 16, 17). Defendant made a motion 
requiring the Plaintiff to sign and fully answer the Inter-
rogatories (R 2'6) which motion was granted. In compli-
ance with the Court Order Peter G. Condas signed the 
Interrogatories, still relying upon the tax deed adjudi-
cated in the 1st case and the deed dated January 12, 
1956 (R 33). It was not until the 2nd set of Interroga-
tories (R 35, 36) that Mr. Condas admitted the first deed 
dated October 20, 1950 (R 37). 
The J udgrnent and Findings were signed and filed 
on the 3rd day of November, 1958. R. J. Fry, Inc. was 
never served with Summons or entered its appearance 
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in the 1st case. In this action, Peter G. Condas has filed 
suit cla,iming title through his tax deed, the same deed 
that was involved in the case of Sugarhouse Mercantile 
Co. vs. Salt Lake County and Condas, upon the deed that 
he received from R. J. Fry, Inc. prior to the new trial of 
the 1st case. (R 20, 25). 
The court in its Summary Judgment sets out the 
f.acts upon which it relied for entering the Summary 
Judgment. (R 44, 45). 
THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURIS-
DICTION OF THE APPEAL 
NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS NOT SERVED WIT'HIN 
ONE MONTH AS REQUIRED BY RrLE 73(a). 
Respondent made a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal, 
which Motion was denied, but inasmuch as the grounds 
for dismissal of the appeal were jurisdictional, which 
may at .any time be inquired into and there was no written 
decision, Respondent respectfully requests the permis-
sion of the Court to call again to its attention the fol-
lowing rules and facts. 
That a Summary Judgment \Yas signed and filed 
on February 7, 1962. (R -1-!, -!5) A ~1:otion for a New 
Trial was filed and argued and the Motion was denied 
by an Entered Order dated February :23, 1962 (R 51). 
The Notice of Appeal was not filed until :Jiarch 30, 
1962 (R 52) 7 days .after the ti1ne for appeal had expired. 
The Second Order denying the Motion for a New Trial 
was filed on March 30, 1962. (R 50)~ 
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YVe contend that the District Court had lost juris-
diction before it signed the Second Order and it cannot 
have any effect and this Court does not have jurisdiction 
of the .appeal under Rule 73 (a). 
Rule 73(a) 
PROCEDURE FOR TAKING AN APPEAL 
(a) ''When and How Taken. When an appeal is 
permitted from a district court to the Supreme 
Court, the time within which an appeal may be 
taken shall be one month from the entry of the 
judgment appealed." 
Rule 73 (a) further states: 
"The running of the time for appeal is terminated 
by a timely motion made pursuant to any of the 
rules hereinafter enumer.ated, and the full time 
for appeal fixed in this subdivision commences 
to run and is to be computed from the ENT'RY 
of any of the following orders made upon a timely 
motion under such rules : granting or denying a 
motion * * * or denying a motion for a new 
trial under Rule 59." 
The Court will note time to appeal runs from the 
ENTRY of the Order denying a new trial. 
The word 'order' is defined by Rule 7 (b) .as follows: 
(2) Orders. An Order includes every direction of 
the court including a 1ninute order made and 
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The following is the Order that was entered. (R 51) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF· THE T'HIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, in and for SAL·T LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PETIER G. CONDAS 
Pla~"'vntiff 
VS 
SUGARHOUSE MERCANTILE COMPANY 
Defendant 
ENTERED ORDE.R 
Case Number 125563 
Dated Feb. 23, 1962 
ST'EW ART M. HANSON, Judge 
The matter of plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial .and to amend summary judgment comes 
now on before the Court for hearing, the plaintiff 
being represented by David E. West as counsel, 
the defendant being represented by G. W. Rob-
bins as counsel. Thereupon the Court having 
considered and now being fully advised ~in the 
premises, orders said motion for new trial denied, 
and motion to .amend sununary judgment is 
granted. 
Rule 73 ('a) above quoted provides that the appeal 
must be taken within one month fr01n the entry of the 
judgment or if a Motion for a new trial is tirnely n1ade, 
then the appeal n1nst be taken within one n1onth fr01n 
the ENTERED ORDER denying the n1otion for a New 
Trial, the 1st Entered Order is at (R 51). Since the 
rules have been adopted this Court has held that it 
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1s jurisdictional that the appeal be taken within one 
n1onth and the following cases have been decided by 
this Court under the new rules. 
Anderson v. Anderson 3 U. (2d) 277, 282 P.2d 845 
at page 848: 
"This appeal was not taken in time and the failure 
to do so is jurisdictional and noticeable hy the 
court sua sponte." 
In re Lynch's Estate, 123 U.57 254 P.2d 454 column 
one page 454: 
"held that the one month period for taking an 
appeal from order entered on November 22, 1952, 
expired at the end of December 22, 1952, and 
appeal taken on December 23, 1952 was not 
timely." 
Prior to the rules under section title 104, chapter 
41, this Court held to the same effect that the notice 
of appeal had to be filed within the time allowed by 
the Code of Civil Procedures. The following cases so 
hold. 
Henderson v Barnes, 27 U. 348, 75 P. 759. The Court 
held: 
Appeal which was not taken within prescribed 
period after entry of judgment was ineffectual. 
Progress Spinning & Knitting Co. v Dixie Fire Ins. 
Co., 43 U. 303, 134 P. 1166. The Court held: 
Where the record affirmatively shows that the 
appeal was not truken in time, it must be dis-
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missed, and in the absence of a showing that 
for some good and sufficient re.ason the appeal 
was, nevertheless, taken in time, the dates given 
in the record are controlling. 
State v Hansen, 51 U. 514, 171 P. 515. The court 
held: 
Appeal would be dismissed where it was not taken 
until eleven days after six months from time of 
entry of judgment. 
Rule 73 states, the time to appeal is one month from 
the ENTRY OF AN ORDER denying a Motion for a 
New Trial, and this .appeal was not taken within one 
month from the date of the Entered Order (R 51). 
Therefore, the time for appeal commenced to run 
on February 23; 1962 at the time of the Entered Order. 
If this is not the rule, the time for appeal could be 
extended indefinitely by getting the trial court to enter 
a Second Order, even years after the ruling on the 
Motion for ,a new T!rial. It has been the practice of 
both the Trial Court and Attorneys not to prepare a 
Second Order. If the Trial Court and the Attorneys 
are not doing this correctly, we respectfully submit 
that the Lawyers and the Judges of the State of Utah 
should he informed by a written opinion of this Court, 
that the· time for appeal does not start to run until 
after the Entered Order and the preparation and filing 
of a Second Order. 
10 
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ANSWERING PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF BARRED FROM ASSERTING CLAIM 
The plaintiff is barred from asserting a new title 
because his deed was obtained prior to the hearing of 
the case in the Supreme Court and prior to the new 
trial of the first case (R 37). Mr. Condas received the 
deed of October 20, 1950 and the new trial was held on 
the 3rd day of June, 1953 (R 24). Mr. Condas had all 
of the title at the time of the new trial that he now 
has and under the rule this Court laid down in the 
case of T·odaro v Gardner, 3 Utah 2d 404, 285 P.2d 
839. He must assert that claim and we quote from page 
841 top of the 1st column : 
"* * * that a party is concluded in ,a subsequent 
matter not only as to matters actually determined 
in the prior action, but also as to other issues 
which could properly have been determined." 
Logan City v Utah Power & Light Co., 86U340 
16 P.2d 1097 at page 1101 first column last paragraph: 
"It is well settled that it is the duty of a party 
to interpose such defense as it may have to an 
action brought against it, and, if it fails to do 
so, the resulting judgment is conclusive against 
it as to .all matters of defense which were or 
might have been interposed.'' 
.And on page 1100 second column second paragraph: 
11 
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"There are no maxims of the law more f~rmly 
established, or of more value in the administra-
tion of justice, than the two which are designed 
to prevent repeated litigation between the s.ame 
parties in regard to the same subject of contro-
versy; namely, in terest rei publicae, ut sit finis 
litium, and nemo debet bis vexari pro una et 
eadam caus.a." 
And on page 1100 first column end of first paragraph: 
"'The interests of society demand that there shall 
be a termination to every controversy.'' 
Other cases holding to the s.ame effect are: 
Stephani v Abbott, 137 Cal. App. 510 30 P.2d 1033 
Everhill v Swan, 20 U. 56, 57 P. 716 
Peay v Salt L.ake City, 11 U. 331, 40 P. 206 
Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v Millen 50 U. 49, 165 
P. 791 
Rule 13 (d) provides : 
"(D) COUNTERCLAIM MATURIKG OR AC-
QUIRED AFT'ER PLEADING. A claim whlch 
either matured or was acquired by the pleader 
after serving his pleading may, with the per-
mission of the court, be presented as a counter-
claim by supplemental pleading." 
Our former section of the Utah Statute \Yas 104-9-3. 
Failure to Set up Counterclaim, states: 
"If the defendant 01nits to set up a counter-
claim in the cases mentioned in the first sub-
divis,ions of the next preceding section, neither 
he nor his assignee ean afterwards maintain an 
action against the plaintiff therefore.'' 
It is immaterial what title he had at the time of 
the first trial because the new trial gave Mr. Condas 
12 
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the opportunity to put in evidence all the title he had 
up to and including the time of the retrial. In suits to 
quiet title the plaintiff pleads that he is the owner of 
the property and the defendant pleads that he is the 
owner of the property and then they put in all of the 
evidence that they have. There was no need for the 
pleading to be amended in the first case, but if Plaintiff 
wanted to amend the pleadings, the Court could have 
allowed the amendment. 
Larsen v. Gasberg, 43 U. 203, 134 P. 885, on page 
887, 2nd column: 
"* * * and it may permit amendments to the 
pleadings to the same extent that it might have 
done before the trial." 
The first case was reversed and unconditionally 
g-ranted a new trial. Mr. Condas had the deed of October 
20, 1950 when the case was re-tried. He had the right 
and the duty to put in evidence whatever title he was 
going to rely upon. At the new trial the Sugarhouse 
Mercantile Co. and Mr. and Mrs. Condas were both put 
on the duty of proving their respective title and case. 
The words 'new trial' has been discussed in the 
following Rule .and cases : 
Rule 76 provides: 
"If a new trial is granted, the court shall pass 
upon and detern1ine all questions of law involved 
in the case presented upon the appeal and nec-
essary to the final determination of the case.''' 
13 
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Larsen v Gasberg, 43 U. 203, 134 P. 885 at page 887 top 
of page 2nd Column states: 
"Where a judgment is reversed and a new trial 
granted without any specific instructions or direc-
tions, the case stands in the lower court pre-
cisely as it did before a trial was had in the first 
instance." 
Hathaway vs United Tintic Mines Co. 42 U. 520, 132 P. 
388 and Greehalgh v United Tin tic Mines Co., 42 U. 524, 
132 P. 390 holds : 
Where the matters involved have not been fully 
litigated, Supreme Court will not enter up judg-
ment on appeal, but will remand for new trial. 
The Supreme Court decision in the first case states 
the c.ase was remanded for a new trial unconditionally 
and the mere stating of the fact that the defendant.was 
entitled to reimbursement was not a restrictive condi-
tion. 
At the new trial the Court had to determine all 
of the issues including the rights to reimbursmnent. The 
court made it clear in the c.ase of Toronto v Sheffield 
118 U. 460 222 P.2d 59'4, that where the fee title owner 
sued that a tax title claimant was entitled to reimburse-
ment 
It is true that where a case is remanded for restric-
tive purposes that the lower court has to follow the 
mandate of the Supreme Court, but there \Yas no Inan-
date contained in the Supren1e Court decision linliting 
Mr. Condas to any particular evidence or title. The 
14 
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eases cited in Defendant's Brief are distinguishable on 
the facts and the orders in the decision. The cases did 
not grant a new trial, but gave specific directions. The 
defendant cites the case of Consolidated Cut Stone Co. 
et .al v Seindenbach, 180 Okla, 128, 114 P.2d 480, it 
\Yas not reversed and remanded for a new trial, but 
was remanded with specific instructions. See the first 
case of Consolidated Cut Stone Co. et al v Seindenbach, 
181 Okla, 578, 75 P.2d 442 and the Order on page 463. 
The defendant cites the case of Jorgensen v Bigelow 
34 Idaho 541 217 P. 265. It was not reversed and re-
Inanded for a new trial, but was remanded with specific 
instructions. See the first case which was entitled J org-
ensen v McAllister 34 Idaho 182 202 P. 1059 and the 
Order on page 1061. 
These cases are entirely different and distinguish-
able from this Court's decision in the first case, in which 
case the judg1nent was reversed .and the case was re-
Inanded with instructions to grant a new trial with 
no limitations on the issues. 
Mr. Condas had the deed from R. J. Fry, Inc. at 
the time of the new trial. It was not only his privilege, 
but it was the duty of Mr. Condas to decide whether or 
not he was going to rely upon his tax title deed or on 
the deed from R .. J. ~..,ry, Inc., or on both of them and 
when he didn't do so, he forever waived it. F'rom the 
first set of Interrogatories it is apparent that Mr. Condas 
intended not to mention the deed of October 20, 1950, 
but to rely upon the later deed so that it would appear 
he only had the tax deed at the time of the new trial. 
15 
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POINT II 
NEW TRIAL DETERMINED ALL ISSUES 
The Trial Court at the time of the new trial did 
not refuse to determine any matter pertaining to the 
title that Mr. Condas acquired from R. J. Fry, Inc. 
(R 22, 23, 24 24A, 25). At the time of the new trial 
R. J. Fry, Inc. w.as neither a necessary nor a proper 
party because its interest in the property had been con-
veyed to Mr. Condas and as successor in interest to 
R. J. Fry. Inc. he was bound to assert that title. The 
case of T·odaro v Gardner 3 Utah 2d 404, 285 P.2d 839 
holds th.at to matters actually determined in the prior 
action, but also as to other issues which could properly 
have been determined. A party is concluded in a sub-
sequent trial from asserting it and the other cases we 
have cited. 
The issues at the new trial w:as what title Mr. Condas 
had, and if for reasons best known to him and to his 
attorney, he elected not to put his newly acquired title 
in evidence, he is estopped frmn asserting it later as 
against the plaintiff. 
POINT III 
TAX TITLE ADJUDICATED AT NEW TRIAL 
Plaintiff has contended throughout the case that 
he did have a deed from R. J. Fry, Inc. Xow he cannot 
assume that he did not have a deed. 
This action cannot be 1naintained on the basis of 
the original tax title because the tax title was adjudicated 
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;eJ 
at the new trial of the c.ase to be invalid, and Mr. Condas 
acquired no title frmn Salt Lake County,· op_ly the right 
to reiinbursement which money he received (R 24A). 
Toronto v Sheffield, 118 U. 460, 222 P.2d 594 at· 
page 600 paragraph 4 it states: 
"As the result of this action plaintiff's title will 
be adjudicated to be invalid." 
And at page 595 2nd column it states: 
"Defendants' claim that under the evidence plain-
tiffs' title was invalid and the action must be 
dismissed. See Telons v. Staley, 104 Utah 537, 
144 P.2d 513; Equitable Life and Cas. Inc. Co. 
v Schoewe, 105 Utah 569, 144 P.2d 5·26; Tree v 
White, 110 Utah 233, 171 P.2d 398; Petterson v 
Ogden City, 111 Utah 125, 176 P.2d 599; Anson 
v Ellison, 104 Utah 576, 140 P.2d 653." 
A statute passed and a case decided subsequent to· 
the trial of the instant case certainly cannot have any· 
effect upon this case. 
The interest of R. J. Fry, Inc. was or should have 
been adjudicated at the new trial. The interest of R. J. 
Fry, Inc. at the time of the new trial was held by Mr. 
Condas and he was bound to assert any claim that he 
had by virtue of that title, and Mr. Condas cannot assert 
a title against himself. R. J. Fry, Inc. at the time of 
the new trial was neither a party or a necessary party 
and it would have been improper to make them a party.· 
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CONCLU'SION 
Litigation should be brought to an end. A pf\,rty 
should not be allowed to assert one defense in one law-
suit and then bring a new lawsuit asserting a claim which 
he had and which could have been ,asserted in the other 
case. Sugarhouse Mercantile Co., defendant and respon-
dent, respectfully requests that the judgment of the 
lower court be sustained or the appeal be dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GOLDEN W. ROBBINS 
Attorney for Sugarhouse Mercantile 
Company, 
Defendant and Respondent 
711 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah· 
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